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HOW EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION IS DETERMINED IN 
FTSE 350 COMPANIES:  RESULTS OF AN EXPLORATORY STUDY 
Ruth Bender, Cranfield School of Management 
Abstract 
 
This paper sets out the results of interview-based research into the way in which 
executive directors’ remuneration is set in two UK utilities.   
Although the subject of executive directors’ remuneration has been widely 
researched, little work has addressed the question ‘how is the directors’ remuneration 
determined?’.  This study addresses that research gap through direct and in-depth 
questioning of key people involved in the remuneration-setting process. 
Research was carried out at two UK utilities, both listed in the FTSE 350.  In each 
company, interviews were conducted individually with the key executives and non 
executives involved in the remuneration-setting process, and with the compensation 
consultants who acted as their advisors, to determine the processes undertaken and the 
factors affecting their decisions.  The interviews were semi structured, in order to 
enable open discussion and ensure a wide-ranging discussion of the protagonists’ 
actions and reasoning. 
The findings of the research project reflected both economic and social-psychological 
theories adopted in the executive remuneration literature.  The interviews showed that 
the level and structure of remuneration were clearly influenced by ‘the market’, 
although issues were surfaced about the problems of determining a suitable 
comparator market.  Institutional theory influences were identified in the level and 
structure of the pay, and the way trends in practices influenced the protagonists.  
Furthermore, the way in which the companies’ policies were tailored to their 
corporate strategies was consistent with contingency theory. 
 
  
 
 HOW EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION IS DETERMINED IN 
FTSE 350 COMPANIES:  RESULTS OF AN EXPLORATORY STUDY 
 
Introduction 
Researchers have been investigating the subject of directors’ remuneration for almost 
80 years (Taussig and Baker, 1925).  During that time, the focus has been on using 
archival data to establish the relationship between the level of pay and factors such as 
corporate performance or board composition.  Such research has proved conceptually 
important and added considerably to our understanding of executive remuneration 
issues.  However, the emphasis on archival data has led to research which has circled 
around a question of interest both to academics and practitioners:  how are executive 
directors’ remuneration policies and packages determined? 
 
This issue has been raised by several researchers over the last two decades.  For 
example, Kerr and Bettis, in a study which examined archival data for a sample of 
Fortune 500 companies, noted the following in 1987: 
 
“It is difficult not to concur with critics who claim that there is no 
rational basis for the compensation paid to top management … research 
thus far has failed to provide solid evidence to refute the charge.  
Perhaps what is needed are studies that look closely at the process by 
which boards make compensation decisions.  Most research has 
attempted to infer the critical variables in the process by examining 
decision outcomes in relation to performance.  As a result, we continue 
to guess at the inputs to the compensation decision.  Given the 
importance of the topic and of the corporate governance process in 
general, it is clear that we must get closer to the process of top 
management compensation if we are to understand it.”  (1987:  661). 
 
This call to get closer to the process has been ignored by most researchers (although 
Conyon et al. (2000) show useful results from an interview-based study with directors 
of large UK companies).  This paper presents findings from an exploratory study 
which directly addresses the question of how directors’ remuneration policies and 
packages are set.  A qualitative methodology was used, interviewing the protagonists 
in the remuneration-setting decision at two listed utilities.  The research findings 
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suggest that aspects of both economic and social-psychological approaches are 
relevant in understanding how directors’ remuneration is set.  
 
Review of previous research 
Previous research has viewed the phenomenon of directors’ remuneration through two 
distinct lenses:  economic theories and social-psychological theories.  Economic 
explanations have revolved around the actions of Rational Man, acting either as a self-
serving individual, or as a participant in the labour market.  Social-psychological 
explanations consider the motivations driving the protagonists, and the relationships 
between them.  The following paragraphs expand on these issues.   
 
Economic theories 
Economics is the dominant paradigm in research into executive remuneration, and 
within this paradigm the most commonly espoused theory is agency theory.  Agency 
theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976;  Eisenhardt, 1989) takes the view that the goals of 
directors (agents) and the shareholders who own the company (principals) differ.  
Directors are assumed to be effort-averse and risk-averse and, if left to their own 
devices, would run companies to suit their own purposes.  Agency theory sees the 
remuneration contract as one way to ensure that the directors act in the shareholders’ 
interests.  Accordingly, contracts are devised which include an element of 
performance-related pay, with the performance measure(s) being set so as to coincide 
with the shareholders’ needs.   
 
Agency theory reflects the behaviour of Man as an individual.  Other economic 
theories use market forces as their explanation of directors’ pay.  Proponents of labour 
market theory (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997;  Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996) 
argue that directors’ pay can be explained in terms of the supply of and demand for 
top executives.  Ezzamel and Watson (1998) refer to the need to pay the ‘going rate’ 
to executives, in order to motivate and retain them.  An alternative economic 
explanation, human capital theory (Agarwal, 1981;  Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996) 
would be that the amount paid to a director reflects also the qualities that s/he brings 
to the job – age, education, qualifications, tenure, etc.   
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 Social-psychological theories 
A wide range of social-psychological theories has been used to account for the 
phenomenon of directors’ remuneration.  These theories relate both to the individual 
being paid, and to groups of people. 
 
The main explanation that relates to the individual is equity theory.  This is a 
motivational theory, proponents of which (Adams, 1963;  Miller, 1995) argue that 
employees consider the ratio of their inputs (how hard they work) to their outputs 
(how much they get paid) and then compare that ratio to a referent, for example 
another employee, or an individual in another, similar company.  Should they 
conclude from this comparison that they are treated more or less favourably than 
others, equity theory asserts that they will respond by raising or lowering their work 
efforts, in order to re-establish equity. 
 
Spanning the boundary between the individual and the group are theories of power 
and politics.  According to such theories, the determination of directors’ remuneration 
is in part a process of negotiation between the protagonists (Miller, 1995;  Williams, 
1994), and the outcome of negotiations is often favourable to those with power, who 
negotiate from strength.  Finkelstein (1992) defined power as the capacity of 
individual actors to exert their will.  It is argued (Ungson and Steers, 1984) that if 
CEOs (on whom most research studies have focused) have power over the 
remuneration committee, they will have favourable terms in their remuneration 
contracts, such as higher pay or a lower performance-related element.  
 
Linked to power theories are theories of social influence (Lambert, Larcker and 
Weigelt, 1993).  ‘Social influence’ can refer to several different types of relationship 
that may occur in a board of directors.  It may be seen in the desire to reciprocate 
favours done by one director for another;  in deference shown to figures of authority;  
in social relationships between individuals who get on well;  or in the influence that 
similarities and differences in social status bring to a relationship.  Social influence 
may result in the remuneration committee being ‘captured’ by executives if the CEO 
was appointed before most of the non executives (Main, O’Reilly and Wade, 1995). 
 
 
3
 Another theory which may be applicable is social comparison theory (Festinger, 
1954), which suggests that individuals evaluate themselves by comparison with others 
whom they perceive to have similar abilities to themselves.  In the context of research 
into directors’ remuneration, it is argued (O’Reilly, Main and Crystal, 1988) that 
executives’ salaries will be set with reference to the remuneration committee 
members’ experience of the pay that they and others receive in their own (outside) 
executive roles: the greater their remuneration, the greater that voted to the CEO.   
 
Social comparison theory sees the remuneration committee members looking towards 
their own experience.  Institutional theory, on the other hand, sees them seeking wider 
referents.  Institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) considers the isomorphic 
pressures that influence companies to act in similar ways.  Such pressures may arise 
due to regulatory influence (coercive isomorphism) or due to imitation of ‘best 
practice’ (mimetic isomorphism) or be passed on through the professional practices of 
consultants (normative isomorphism). 
 
Isomorphic pressures may thus provide a coherent explanation for the homogeneity of 
companies’ remuneration practices (New Bridge Street, 2001, 2002).  Finkelstein and 
Hambrick (1996:  275) discuss the isomorphic pressures which may lead to similarity 
in pay structures between companies and, more particularly, within industries.  They 
note that many industries have distinct pay patterns and suggest that isomorphism, in 
particular, practices passed on by consultants, might be an explanation of this.   
 
Linked closely to institutional theory are theories of legitimacy.  Legitimacy relates to 
the way in which organisations seek to accord with society’s expectations in order to 
gain acceptance.  It is defined by Suchman (1995: 574) as “a generalized perception 
or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, beliefs and definitions”. 
 
Legitimacy has relevance to directors’ remuneration as society’s perception of the 
remuneration may affect the company’s status in the domains from which it draws 
resources.  Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman (1997) suggest that one reason companies adopt 
compensation practices that are widely accepted in their industry is to gain legitimacy.  
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If a company is seen as being over-generous in paying its directors, its reputation may 
suffer and it may lose valuable support.  The use of remuneration consultants can also 
be seen as a legitimising device, in that they are external to the company, and so their 
advice is presumably independent (Barkema and Gomez Mejia, 1998). 
 
Legitimacy also affects the way that boards operate and structure themselves.  
Harrison (1987) suggests that board committees have at least two roles:  to carry out 
their stated duties and to legitimise the acts of the company.  A remuneration 
committee, for example, determines the remuneration of the executive directors;  
additionally its very existence is a signal to the outside world that the company’s 
governance accords with accepted practice.   
 
It is worth considering another theoretical perspective through which directors’ 
remuneration can be considered – decision theory.  Decision theory is a broad field 
and only two aspects of it are considered here:  anchoring-and-adjustment, and 
bounded rationality. 
 
The anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) suggests that 
in many situations people make numerical estimates by starting from an initial value 
(the anchor), and adjusting this to yield a final answer.  Tversky and Kahneman’s 
findings show that the adjustments made are usually insufficient:  different starting 
points yield different estimates, which are biased towards the initial values.  The 
relevance of this to executive remuneration is that remuneration committees often 
have a figure given to them as a starting point, either previous years’ pay, or salary 
surveys, and their judgement may be influenced by this anchor. 
 
The second aspect of decision theory that appears applicable is bounded rationality 
(Simon, 1957).  This suggests that human beings have limited mental capacity and 
cannot obtain, and could not cope with, all the possible information needed in order to 
take a fully informed decision.  Accordingly, they obtain sufficient information to 
come to a decision, and base their decision on their model of the world obtained from 
that limited information.  In the context of the remuneration-setting decision, a huge 
amount of information is potentially available, and it might be that busy individuals 
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‘satisfice’ their decision by obtaining only part of the available information, and 
making their decisions based on only part of that. 
 
Finally, we turn to contingency theory.  Proponents of contingency theory (Balkin and 
Gomez-Mejia, 1987;  Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998;  Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998) 
argue that for companies to be effective in realising their intended strategies, there has 
to be an alignment between the strategy and the company and the environment in 
which it operates.  In terms of remuneration, this suggests that remuneration policies 
for directors should reflect the company’s overall strategy.  If they do not, the lack of 
fit is likely to impede the effective implementation of strategy. 
 
Research Methodology 
This research takes a qualitative approach, a novel methodology in the area of 
research into directors’ remuneration, as most previous studies have analysed archival 
data (for example Jensen and Murphy, 1990).  As an exploratory study into a process, 
the use of case studies is an appropriate methodology to adopt for the research (Harris 
and Ogbonna, 2002;  Bonoma, 1985). 
 
The two companies which form the case studies are both utilities (i.e. in the 
electricity, gas, water or telecoms sectors of the market), quoted in the FTSE 350.  In 
considering directors’ remuneration in the UK, the privatised utilities have an 
interesting place in history.  It was primarily the generous packages awarded to the 
directors of the newly-privatised utilities that led to adverse public and government 
attention which ultimately resulted in the setting up of the Greenbury Committee, 
which produced its influential report on directors’ remuneration in 19951.  Utilities 
were the perceived home of the original ‘fat cats’, although much has changed in the 
sector since that time. 
 
A second reason for choosing utilities as the context for the case studies is that profits 
in that sector are heavily influenced by a regulator (Ofgem, Ofwat, Oftel), who makes 
a regulatory review at five-yearly intervals and effectively wipes out the companies’ 
                                                 
1 There is even a section in the Greenbury report – section 8 – relating specifically to privatised 
utilities. 
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profit potential in their regulated businesses, re-setting prices at a level which is 
intended to be sufficient only to cover the cost of capital (Ofwat 2002).  As at least 
part of remuneration is linked to profit in the majority of companies (New Bridge 
Street, 2001) the way in which companies structure their remuneration to adapt to this 
constraint is also of interest. 
 
Because of the impact of the regulator on profits, utilities in the UK often choose to 
expand their activities beyond those within the regulator’s remit.  This may be done 
by diversifying into related businesses, or by expanding their geographic reach.  
Individual utilities have adopted very different business strategies in this respect. 
 
The data source for identifying sample companies was the PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Corporate CD Register.  The initial searches were made on the database dated June 
2001.  In total, 15 utilities were identified.  The two companies for the pilot studies 
were selected at random from these.  Both were ‘cold called’ in December 2001 to 
determine their interest in the study, and both agreed to participate.2 
 
The companies were originally selected because some or all of their non executive 
directors sat on the remuneration committees of other listed companies.  It was felt 
that interviewing individuals with experience of different contexts would add to the 
richness of the data, and this indeed proved correct.  Both of the non executive 
directors interviewed sat on several boards, and during the interviews they brought 
experience from those other boards and contrasted it with the situation in the case 
study companies3.  The remuneration consultants also were asked to compare their 
experience in the case study companies with that in other companies, as were the 
chairmen and those executives who had outside experience. 
 
Coincidentally, there were other similarities between the companies, which proved 
valuable for the research.  In each of the companies, there had been no award made 
                                                 
2 As research access was conditional on maintaining the anonymity of the companies and the 
interviewees, no details are given about the specific remuneration policies adopted by the companies, 
nor about the amounts paid to their directors.  Further, where necessary some company-specific 
information has been disguised. 
3 In each company, the executives and remuneration committee members between them held more than 
eight other current directorships in listed companies, and had been involved at director level at more 
than 15 other listed companies in the last five years. 
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under the long term remuneration plan for a period of several years.  Further (and 
related in part to the previous point), each of the companies had changed its long term 
remuneration plan significantly in the previous three years, and had changed its 
annual bonus plan slightly in that period.  Finally, each of the companies had changed 
its remuneration consultants within the last two years4.  Discussion of these changes 
presented a useful focus for the interviews, and provided an excellent source of 
information about the processes. 
 
In each company, semi-structured interviews were carried out with the following 
people involved in the remuneration-setting process: 
 chairman of the remuneration committee (‘Chairman’5) 
 another remuneration committee member (‘NXD’) 
 human resources director (‘HR’) 
 chief executive officer (‘CEO’) and 
 remuneration consultant employed by the company (‘Consultant’). 
 
In Utility 1, the compensation and benefits manager (‘Comp’) was also interviewed. 
 
Scheduling interviews with such high profile people was not easy:  the interviews 
were conducted between the end of December 2001 and May 2002.  They took place 
as the various offices of the individuals being interviewed.  The interviews were semi 
structured, in that a broad interview brief was prepared.  However, being exploratory 
in nature, the discussions ranged widely around those questions.  Further, as Hill 
(1995) noted, in interviewing people of status the balance of power, normally with the 
interviewer, is with the interviewee.  Accordingly, the conversation were often very 
discursive, although the core elements of the interview brief were always covered. 
 
In addition to interviews, data were gathered about the case organisations and their 
institutional environments from the following sources:  the latest annual report and 
accounts and the one for the prior year;  internal documentation (where offered – 
neither company made all of the relevant documentation available);  scheme 
                                                 
4 In one company the interview was with the outgoing consultant, in the other it was with the incoming 
consultant.  In both cases these were the individuals who had advised on the remuneration policy and 
packages in the latest published accounts. 
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documentation for each company;  remuneration consultants’ reports for each 
company;  and analysts’ reports on the companies. 
 
Data Analysis 
All of the interviews except one were taped and transcribed6.  Transcripts have been 
reviewed by the interviewees, who made some minor amendments, none of which 
changed the substance of the transcript. 
 
Coding of the transcripts is underway, and is being facilitated using Nvivo.  Data 
coding commenced with the researcher drawing up a preliminary list of possible 
codes, based on the literature review.  As the coding progressed, this list was altered 
and extended to include ‘in vivo’ codes.  The findings reported in this preliminary 
paper reflect the analysis done to date of these data. 
 
Key findings 
The findings reported in this paper focus on the strategic issues faced in setting the 
executive directors’ remuneration and, in particular, on the considerations taken into 
account in making the changes, mentioned above, to their remuneration policies.  In 
this section the following issues are addressed: 
 
• The link between corporate strategy and remuneration policies; 
• The choice of the form of the long term remuneration scheme; 
• The use of comparators;  and 
• The influence of history. 
 
The link between corporate strategy and remuneration policies 
As stated earlier, both of the case study companies had changed their remuneration 
policies in recent years.  From the interviews in both companies, this appeared to be 
                                                                                                                                            
5 The term ‘Chairman’ is used regardless of the gender of the individual. 
6 The one interview that was not taped occurred ‘spontaneously’ whilst I was in the offices of Comp 1, 
waiting for a meeting with CEO 1.  What I had expected to be a brief contact turned into an hour long 
meeting, and I did not want to interrupt the flow by getting out the tape recorder.  Extensive notes were 
taken at the time, supplemented by a full note written later that afternoon. 
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for the same two reasons:  human resources (HR) explanations and strategic 
explanations.   
 
HR reasons 
One of the reasons for the change was the fact that the executives had not received a 
payout from the long term schemes for several years.  This was seen as a motivational 
issue.  Interviewees put the argument that pay is meant to ‘attract, retain and motivate’ 
(Greenbury, 1995:  section 1.10) and human resource management issues were a key 
part of remuneration strategy.  A scheme which had not paid out, and showed little 
chance of paying out, was seen as being a poor motivator, and as possibly failing to 
retain good directors. 
 
“And if you were in a plan where was no possibility of payment even if you were 
just below median, then the view was taken that this isn't working as an incentive 
or a handcuff, and it is demotivating.” 
Consultant 2 
 
“Then the message is coming through loud and clear that they have the long-
term incentive that is not incentivising.  So when you then get a response from 
the executives which is reinforcing those sort of messages, you don't have to be 
a rocket scientist to work out that you need to do something.” 
Comp 1 
 
During the interviews, I suggested that an alternate view would be that the schemes 
had not paid out because performance had been less than required, and so the 
participants should not really expect to receive a payment that was not deserved.  The 
response to this was that although that is what the logic of the situation might demand, 
it was felt that the individuals still needed to be motivated and retained, and that the 
pay award was a way to do this.  HR 2 explained it as follows: 
 
“Really, it [the long term scheme] fell into disrepute as a means of remunerating 
people, because it did not pay out for two, and then three years.  People just 
looked at it negatively.  The fact that the company had not performed even at 
median level when compared with its peers in terms of total shareholder return 
was not something that they were focusing on.” 
HR 2 
 
In response to the same point, about payment not being deserved, NXD 2 responded 
in the context of another company with which he was connected, in which the 
executive share options were underwater: 
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“Oh, that is an argument that is put, but I don't think that it carries you very much 
further forward.  You could say that they’ve gone so far underwater that the 
management doesn't deserve it.  You could say that the management should 
therefore be sacked, you should find a new management.  And there is a bit of 
that, I'm sure.  But every day is the first day of the rest of our lives.” 
NXD 2 
 
The thrust of his argument was that having got into that situation, the management 
needed to be encouraged to bring the company out of it.  This view was reflected by 
several of the interviewees (although views on how to address the issue, for example 
by repricing options, were polarised, with some interviewees in favour, and others 
very much against). 
 
Views such as those expressed by NXD 2 would seem to conflict with the traditional 
view of performance related pay set out by proponents of agency theory.  Paying the 
executives despite their not achieving performance targets conflicts with the agency 
view of using remuneration to encourage them to act in accordance with shareholders’ 
wishes as expressed in the remuneration contract:  the sanction of performance related 
pay is diminished if the executives are reasonably confident that incentives will be 
reinstated regardless of performance. 
 
Strategic reasons 
The other reason for changing the long term incentive scheme was that both 
companies had changed their corporate strategy in recent years, and it was felt that the 
remuneration policy had to be changed in order to support the change in corporate 
strategy. 
 
This link of remuneration with strategy was substantiated by the fact that the two 
companies, apparently facing a similar, heavily regulated environment, had chosen 
very different remuneration policies.  Each had the traditional components of salary, 
with short term and long term performance-related elements, but the way they 
configured these components was very different.  At first sight this made little sense, 
but during the course of the interviews the very different strategic aims they were 
following (for example, their different approaches towards diversification) became 
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apparent, and it was clear how the chosen remuneration schemes fitted in with these 
strategies. 
 
Consultant 1 explained the change in scheme for Utility 1 in these terms: 
 
“The output of the process, the committee felt, and I wouldn't disagree with it, 
was that the new arrangements better suited the company's then-current 
structure and focus.  They went through what I think is a fairly typical process.  
They deliberated fairly long and hard on the needs of the business first of all.”   
Consultant 1 
 
HR 1 explained that considerable thought had gone into devising an appropriate 
remuneration strategy.  He pointed out that the core business, being a utility, was 
relatively risk-free compared to, say, running a dot.com, and so the remuneration 
packages had to reflect that.  However, he noted that the risk was much higher in 
some of the group’s unregulated activities, and this part of the business merited a 
different reward structure.  He explained that at the very top of the business (the focus 
of this research) the collective responsibility of the board meant that board executives’ 
pay was not highly differentiated to reflect these different businesses;  but at the levels 
immediately below the board the situation was different: 
 
“Underneath the top people, there's quite a degree of variety.  We've changed 
every remuneration policy in the group over the last two years.  Every single 
one. And that's to reflect the diversity of the markets we work in.”   
HR 1 
In Utility 2 it was also clear that the group’s strategy had a clear impact on the 
remuneration policies adopted: 
 
“That's the strategic intent … and so that too was part of the decision-making 
process, to ensure that the new arrangements took account of the new strategic 
intent.” 
HR 2 
And 
 
“There was a recognition among the executive that if we were going to change 
direction, then remuneration had to be reviewed as part of that change of 
direction.” 
HR 2 
 
HR 2 went on to discuss how the company’s business would develop further over the 
next two to three years, as the strategy was gradually realised.  He suggested that the 
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remuneration strategy would have to be adapted further at that time, better to reflect 
these new circumstances. 
 
In both companies the type of scheme chosen and the performance measures adopted 
were designed to focus the actions of the directors, and to send clear signals 
throughout the organisation as to what was expected from the new strategy.  The 
concept of tailoring the remuneration strategy to suit the corporate strategy seems to 
reflect a contingency theory approach.  Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1987) take the view 
that effectiveness at realising intended strategies depends significantly on the 
existence of a match among strategy, organisation and environment.  This was borne 
out in the views expressed in the interviews. 
 
The form of the long term scheme:  options versus ltips 
A standard executive remuneration package in the UK includes a base salary, perks, 
participation in an annual bonus scheme, a long term incentive, and a pension 
contribution.  This section focuses on the long term incentive, whose aim, in addition 
to rewarding and retaining executives, is to reinforce company strategy (Langley, 
1997).  Within the constraints of their strategic imperatives, the companies had to 
determine appropriate schemes to adopt.  In practice, long term incentive schemes 
tend to fall into two types:  executive share option schemes, and other schemes, 
known generically as ltips (long term incentive plans). 
 
An executive share option scheme awards the executive a number of call options on 
the shares of the company, which can be exercised during some future period, 
normally between three and ten years after the grant date.  Common practice in the 
UK is that the exercise price of the options will be the same as the share price at the 
date of grant.  It is also customary in the UK for executive share options to be 
exercisable only on the achievement of a performance condition, often growth in 
earnings per share (eps) over the period (New Bridge Street, 2002).  
 
Ltips may take a variety of forms.  Generally, there will be an immediate award of 
shares to the executive;  however, these shares will not vest until some time in the 
future, provided that certain performance conditions have been met.  A majority of 
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UK companies using ltips use comparative total shareholder return (TSR) as their 
performance condition (New Bridge Street, 2002).  This measures the company’s 
percentage return to shareholders over the period (share price changes plus dividends) 
compared to that in a comparator group;  the level of the ltip award depends on how 
highly ranked the company is in relation to its comparator group. 
 
The literature on executive remuneration clearly sets out the advantages and 
disadvantages of share option schemes as opposed to other types of long term 
performance incentive.  For example Hall (1997) points out the advantages of options, 
whereas Yermack (1997) illustrates some of their problems.  Bender (2001) discusses 
the different features of the various plans, and concludes that there is no one correct 
answer to suit all circumstances. 
 
Outside the academic arena, survey evidence indicates trends in remuneration 
schemes in FTSE 350 companies that have moved from the use of options to ltips and 
back to options (New Bridge Street, 2002).  Institutional theory might provide one 
explanation for this trend.  The move from options to ltips in the mid 1990s followed 
the Myners report (1995) and the Greenbury report (1995), both of which pointed out 
the flaws in share option schemes.  This perhaps reflects coercive isomorphism.  
However, companies have found ltips very complex (PIRC, 1998;  
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2001), and a trickle of companies changing back to an 
option for good practical reasons has become a steady flow as others follow, a 
mimetic trend.  Such an institutional theory hypothesis is supported by comments of 
one of the consultants: 
 
“… option schemes amongst public companies are now back in favour, as it 
were.” 
Consultant 
 
The remark that options are ‘in favour’ suggests that there was no clear logical reason 
for adopting this form of incentive rather than an ltip (and this was borne out in the 
rest of that discussion), but that the remuneration committee was merely adopting a 
scheme similar to its peers. 
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In practice, both remuneration committees appear to have followed their individual 
preferences (or the preferences of their dominant members – this could not be 
determined) in deciding whether to go for an option or an ltip.   
 
“So there are pros and cons [between options and ltips].  But I think it is fair to 
say that the members of the remuneration committee all favour options.” 
CEO 
 
“We come to personal wishes....  I think there was a general feeling amongst the 
non-exec members of the board that share options were not the flavour of the 
moment.” 
NXD 
 
I queried this NXD on his comment about options not being the flavour of the month, 
as, as mentioned above, surveys seem to show that they are becoming more popular 
again.  He said that the matter had not been subject to great debate, and that the 
committee members had felt it more appropriate to go for something that demanded a 
higher hurdle rate than options normally have.   
 
This raises another interesting point, regarding the performance measures used in 
options and ltips.  As stated earlier, it is common for share options to use a 
performance measure based on growth in eps, and ltips to use a performance measure 
based on TSR.  However, there is nothing intrinsic to either of the schemes which 
states that these measures must be used, and indeed there are many examples of 
companies doing differently.  Nevertheless, the comments of this NXD, and those of 
the consultant who advised that committee, clearly show that one reason why the ltip 
was adopted in preference to an option was that TSR was seen to be a more 
appropriate target than eps.  In the other utility, which implemented an option scheme 
with an eps target, the Chairman made the following comment when asked why the 
scheme was chosen: 
 
“It is a matter of philosophy, isn't it.  Both in terms of your view on what the most 
appropriate performance indicator is – is it total shareholder return or EPS? -- 
and we could sit here for the next two days arguing about it and not come to a 
conclusion” 
Chairman 
 
Again, his reply to a question about the choice of an option versus an ltip revolved 
around the use of eps growth versus TSR. 
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 In this context it is worth pointing out that the use of eps growth as a performance 
measure is fraught with difficulties for regulated utilities, whose profits are reduced 
by the periodic review every five years.  Companies implementing such a scheme 
have to ensure that it is acceptable to the executives whose retention and motivation it 
is designed to encourage. 
 
Finally, it was also worthy of note that one of the non executives interviewed served 
in an executive capacity in another listed company, in a very different industry, whose 
long term scheme was very similar to that introduced into the utility.  I suggested to 
him that perhaps the similarity of the schemes had been under his influence.  He 
pointed out that the two companies share a remuneration consultant, and suggested 
that perhaps was the other obvious place to look as regards similarities in schemes.  
This could be an example of normative isomorphism. 
 
The use of comparators 
Companies tend to set their executive remuneration in line with ‘the market’.  As well 
as the obvious connection to labour market theory, this could have two social-
psychological explanations.  By using market rates the companies can be seen to be 
satisfying their executives that they are being fairly treated (an equity theory 
explanation) and satisfying their stakeholders than the remuneration is justified (a 
legitimacy explanation).  In this section the two main forms of comparator – for salary 
and for TSR – are discussed. 
 
Paying the ‘market rate’ for salaries 
Throughout the course of the interviews it proved impossible to determine exactly 
what drove either the level of pay or the detail of its structure (for example, how many 
options were to be awarded each year, what level of bonus should be available) other 
than the fact that this was done in ‘the market’.  Questions about ‘what drives the 
market’ or ‘who is the market’ tended to be deflected into answers about the specific 
market comparators that the companies used.   
 
This bears out comments made by Barkema and Gomez-Mejia (1998): 
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 "An important concern in this regard is how to define the market.  The 
relevant market is an abstraction that exists in people's mind.  …  When 
a firm decides to pay executives the going rate in the CEO market, it 
must first decide on the appropriate "comparison others" in the market.  
Making this choice is a social and political process that may not be 
subject to explanation on economic grounds.”  (1998:  141) 
 
Such views were echoed by one of the interviewees: 
  
“And we use the term "labour market" generally as if there was such a thing as a 
labour market.  Truly, the definition or the terminology ‘labour market’ is 
shorthand for a plethora of different markets.” 
Consultant 1 
And later in the same discussion he expanded upon this line of thought: 
 
“Firstly let us identify what we mean by market practice.  We use the phrase too 
carefully.  We assume that there is one market position, let's take job X, that 
there is a market position for base salary, there’s a market position for bonus 
opportunity, and there's a market position for either option grants or real share 
award scheme awards.  There isn't.” 
Consultant 1 
 
He went on to explain that typically in a market  there will be a range of plus or minus 
20% or 25% between quartiles.  Furthermore, as pointed out in the same context by 
Comp 1, even if a company is adopting a ‘median’ remuneration policy, most will 
flex at more than plus or minus 10% from that figure.  Nevertheless, ‘the market’ is 
used as the benchmark to determine executive remuneration and the levels of bonus 
and long term award.  During the course of this line of questioning, comments such as 
the following were typical: 
 
“Well, looking at their competitors I couldn't see that it was driven by market 
practice.”   
Consultant 2 
 
The above comment was in answer to a question as to why the company had not 
adopted a particular alternative policy.  And in the course of the same conversation, 
looking at bonus levels: 
 
“You can only measure these things relative to other companies.  [Pause.]  It's 
very difficult question to answer.” 
Consultant 2 
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 Consultant 1 took a very philosophical approach to the discussions: 
 
“Because there are no absolute rights.  I mean, there is no such thing as 
overpaying, or underpaying executives as an absolute; there is only overpaying 
or underpaying based on some comparative judgement.  And we all bring 
different forms of comparative judgement.” 
Consultant 1 
 
The quotations above all cite consultants because they provided the fullest description 
of this process, and because they are the ones making recommendations to the 
remuneration committee.  However, all of the respondents made similar comments. 
 
In both of the companies the consultants had prepared extensive reports that were 
used to benchmark the executives’ pay against comparators, and in both cases these 
reflected three sets of comparators:  companies in the specific utilities sector, 
companies in their FTSE index, and companies whose businesses reflected the non-
regulated businesses of the case study companies.  These three sets of benchmarks 
were available for each top executive position, giving a lot of data on which the 
decision could be based.  This use of market benchmarks suggests that the 
economists’ concept of paying wages to reflect the marginal contribution of an 
individual (as discussed by Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998) has no direct place in the 
practice of setting directors’ remuneration, and that the practice of paying ‘the 
market’ is institutionalised, perhaps reflecting labour market theory.   
 
The processes reported here can be linked to theory in many ways.  The first and most 
obvious is the connection to labour market theory.  Ezzamel and Watson (1998) refer 
to the need to pay ‘the going rate’ to executives in order to motivate and retain them, 
and one purpose of the consultants’ reports is clearly to identify what this going rate 
might be.  Secondly, in line with the comment by Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, quoted 
above, the decision as to which market to use is not obvious, as illustrated by the 
consultants’ apparent need to provide three separate sets of figures to each company.  
Finally, the findings also support Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) in their comments 
about isomorphic pressures influencing industry-wide remuneration levels.   
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It is also worth considering the process in terms of two aspects of decision theory – 
the anchoring heuristic and bounded rationality.  As regards bounded rationality, it 
seems self-evident that the remuneration committees did not seek all possible 
information on the subject (for example, they only sought the views of one firm of 
consultants;  they only looked at three sets of comparators).  Furthermore, the 
interviewees indicated that the HR professionals prepared and collated a great amount 
of information, of which only summaries, in accordance with normal commercial 
practice, were given to the committees.  Accordingly, it seems reasonable to assume 
that a satisficing decision was made. 
 
It also seems reasonable to assume that the anchoring heuristic influenced the 
decisions.  It was not possible to determine precisely how the remuneration 
committees determined the exact number for directors’ remuneration, to do that, it 
would have been necessary to sit in at the relevant meetings.  However, on the basis 
that the final remuneration figures were of a similar size to the figures produced by 
the consultants, it would be reasonable to assume that the consultants’ reports had 
anchored the committees’ judgement.  It would also seem likely that the remuneration 
in previous years also acted as an anchor in each company.  Indeed, that was borne 
out by one of the HR directors who described the pay regime a few years back as “… 
everybody gets inflation. Full stop.”  This regime had led after a few years to salaries 
at the company being out of line with the market, and dissatisfaction by the executives 
had been one factor leading to realignment with (less than median) market levels. 
 
A final link to theory relates to the use of consultants to produce the market data.  As 
stated earlier, companies need their remuneration practices to be seen to be legitimate 
in the constituencies on which they rely.  One way to demonstrate legitimacy is to rely 
on external providers, who are presumably independent.  The consultants’ part in 
legitimising the actions of the remuneration committee is noted by Barkema and 
Gomez-Mejia (1998:  141) who refer to remuneration decisions “involving 
judgements of the committee members, legitimized by the opinions of external 
consultants”.  This was illustrated in various ways by the interviewees: 
 
“But I do think, there is no doubt that part of this process is a covering of the 
back.  It allows the board to say that it has consulted with consultants.” 
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NXD 2 
 
“We chose, in the interests of self-preservation, to rely heavily on the external 
advice …” 
HR 1 
 
Determining suitable comparators for TSR 
The issue of choosing comparator companies features in two places in the 
remuneration decision.  As discussed above, the ‘market rate’ means that an 
appropriate market needs to be selected.  Also, most ltips use comparative TSR (total 
shareholder return) over a period as the performance benchmark, which means that 
comparator companies need to be selected.   
 
For both of the case study companies, there was a problem in choosing comparator 
companies.  Part of this problem was a very practical one:  as utilities, one obvious 
comparator group is other utilities.  However, over the last three years the number of 
utilities listed on the London Stock Exchange has fallen considerably, due to 
takeovers and mergers.  As the utility pool becomes smaller, it is more difficult to use 
these companies as comparators.  This was expressed by Consultant 2: 
 
“Let's say you start off with ten companies in a comparator group.  Within six 
months a couple of them have been taken over.  You then get down to three or 
four.  Now, how do you measure median and upper decile with three or four 
comparators?  It just becomes meaningless.  What happens if you have a 
takeover or a merger?  Do the schemes pay out, or do you measure up to the 
date of the takeover?  A lot of them pay out in full, and that's given rise to a lot of 
problems.”   
Consultant 2 
 
Building on that point, Comp 1 pointed out that if weaker companies have been taken 
over, such takeovers are likely to have been at a premium to their share prices, thus 
raising the return to their shareholders.  He asked, rhetorically, if it was equitable that 
these artificially high returns should be the benchmark against which the continuing 
companies are judged.  This could be seen as a link back to equity theory, in that the 
executives need to believe that they are being paid fairly, and in line with the pay of 
their peers. 
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The influence of history 
Remuneration policies are not set in a vacuum, and one source of the influences 
which impact a company’s choice of policies may be the events of its past (Gomez 
Mejia, 1994:  206).  As mentioned earlier, the history of directors’ remuneration in 
UK utilities is one of ‘fat cat’ jibes and governmental disapprobation.  Despite the fact 
that the event which set off much of this debate, the 75% pay increase awarded to 
Cedric Brown at British Gas, took place in 1994 (Sunday Times, 11th May 1995), 
evidence of their effects was clear in both case study companies.  This came through 
in the need to legitimise the company’s remuneration policies, for example by using 
consultants, and in the types of packages set. 
 
“I think that one is also a bit sensitive of the background here as a privatised 
utility.  …  so they would come under  more scrutiny... you've got to take that into 
account.” 
Consultant 2 
 
“… had gone through a period of … being in the public eye with a focus on pay.  
So that has an impact.  You have a historical impact.  There's a reaction.” 
Consultant 1 
 
“There is history in all of this.  You can't detach the way the people are paid from 
the cultural  background of the business.” 
CEO 1 
 
“There's quite a lot of history to this, it does go back to the days of the fat cattery. 
… There was a very kind of matter of fact recognition that pay restraint was the 
order of the day.” 
HR 1 
 
The influence of history could also be seen in the example cited above of salary levels 
in one of the companies being limited to inflationary rises, and held at below median.  
In discussions with the directors it became clear that this too was in reaction to 
adverse publicity received in the days of the ‘fat cats’.  Even though none of the 
current remuneration committee had been associated with the company at that time, 
corporate memory appeared to live on. 
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Discussion and conclusions  
The main concern of this paper has been to put forward a preliminary analysis of the 
qualitative empirical research into how the remuneration of executive directors is 
determined.  Data gathered in 11 interviews at two case study companies have been 
analysed to determine the reasons that the companies changed their remuneration 
policies and the strategic factors they considered in making those changes. 
 
One important outcome of the research is that it demonstrates that the remuneration 
policies were devised in the context of the company.  This was shown in two ways.  
The choice of corporate strategy had a clear influence on the remuneration policies 
selected, as the remuneration committee and its advisors tried to align the 
remuneration policies with the strategic imperatives of the company.  The fact that 
two superficially similar companies ended up with two very different remuneration 
policies, based on their new strategies, demonstrates this. Furthermore, the impact of 
the companies’ history on their choice of remuneration levels and policies can also be 
seen as a contextual issue. 
 
A significant debate in the field of directors’ remuneration is between the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of executive share options and other long term 
incentive plans.  This research offers some understanding of how companies choose 
between the two.  It has shown that companies are aware of the features of each, but 
that in the case study companies the decision as to which to use was taken in part 
based on the individual preferences of the remuneration committee members.  An 
institutional theory approach was also influential here, in two ways.  Firstly, in the 
comments made about adopting particular schemes because that is what others were 
doing;  and secondly in the arguments which seemed to equate the type of scheme 
(options, ltip) with the most common performance measure associated therewith (eps 
growth, TSR). 
 
Companies adopt different types of scheme at least in part because they follow what 
other companies are doing.  The influence of other companies is also shown in the 
level of pay that is selected – which is generally based on ‘the market’.  The research 
shows that there are two separate ‘markets’ used by companies in setting 
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remuneration.  In determining an appropriate level of salaries, companies refer to a 
market comprising companies in the same sector, or in the same FTSE grouping, and 
use salary data from these comparators in order to establish where their own salaries 
should lie.  A separate market, much smaller, is used to establish comparators for 
determining how well the company has done in TSR terms when evaluating awards 
for the ltip.  In both cases, the protagonists appreciate the limitations of the market 
they have used. 
 
Finally, the limitations of this study must be acknowledged.  It is a small study, with 
only 11 interviews conducted in two companies.  Further interviews in more 
companies need to be undertaken, and indeed this work is currently underway.  
Having said that, it is worth noting that, as well as the remuneration consultants, who 
obviously have very wide experience, the executives and non executives interviewed 
between them have explicit knowledge of current remuneration practices in many 
other companies, which has extended the scope of the study.   
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